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1. Introduction
Michael Batty is one of the most distin-guished scholars in the field of human 
geography, as well as a scientist with broad 
interests. He was awarded a CBE in June 
2004 for services to geography and made a 
Fellow of the Royal Society in 2009. A few 
years ago, Batty summarized his view of cit-
ies as being “complex systems that mainly 
grow from the bottom up, their size and 
shape following well-defined scaling laws 
that result from intense competition for 
space” (Batty 2008, p. 769). His latest book, 
The New Science of Cities, may be viewed as 
a synthesis of his work in urban geography 
that aims at  developing, as the title suggests, 
a new science of cities.
The book is divided into three main parts. 
In part I, Batty discusses the main concepts 
he uses in his book. Part II focuses on a 
positive analysis of cities and urban systems, 
whereas part III, which addresses the issue 
of urban design, has a normative flavor. 
Providing a thorough discussion of a book 
as rich as Batty’s cannot be done in a review 
without being superficial. I will therefore 
focus on the ideas and concepts underpin-
ning the book. I will also discuss, from an 
economist’s point of view, what I see as the 
book’s main contributions, as well as the top-
ics where there is a real potential for interac-
tion between urban geographers and urban 
economists. I apologize to Batty for not cov-
ering issues that are too far from my domain 
of expertise.
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Batty, as an urban geographer, aims to build 
a geographic theory of cities where aggre-
gates such as populations and various flows 
are central to the argument, whereas urban 
economics focuses on the spatial behavior of 
individual agents—consumers and firms. Yet, 
in my view, such a difference in approaches 
is not necessarily an issue. Indeed, it would 
be futile to expect an integrated theory of 
cities that would appeal equally to econo-
mists, regional scientists, geographers, and 
urban planners. In a word, cities are simply 
too complex. As suggested by Batty, we must 
learn how to live with “a series of approaches 
that adopt . . . various methods and tools” 
(p. 118). There will always be something to 
learn from alternative approaches, and not 
just in urban analysis.
The first three chapters (part I) describe 
the theoretical framework underlying the 
rest of the book; therefore, I find it appropri-
ate to discuss in detail the ideas and concepts 
developed in these chapters.
2. The Proximity/Market Crowding 
Trade-Off
For Batty, locations are important, but 
only as places that anchor interactions (p. 8). 
To put it differently, to understand cities, 
we must view them not simply as places in 
space but as systems of networks and flows. 
Thus, we are far from the attitude of some 
geographers who avoid abstract theories and 
focus on real communities.1 In contrast, we 
are close to urban economics, where first 
nature geography (e.g., natural resources 
and climate differences) is considered weak 
as a way of explaining second nature geogra-
phy, which involves large cities and big trade 
flows.  
1 The tribe of geographers is more heterogeneous than 
that of economists. In this review, by geographers I mean 
quantitative human geographers.
For centuries, the main distinctive fea-
ture of cities was their separation from the 
countryside. This separation no longer exists. 
Urban activities have gradually extended 
beyond the city’s physical boundaries to 
create suburbs and city-edges. These ones 
are now very much part of the city, which 
is considered as an all-encompassing eco-
nomic agglomeration. The main reason for 
the existence of cities is to connect people. 
This vision is now widely embraced by urban 
economists (Glaeser 2011).
Batty’s analysis rests on the key idea that the 
form of a city reflects a fundamental tension 
between the desire to be as close as possible 
to everyone else and the desire to consume as 
much space as possible (pp. 19 and 253). In 
such a setting, the need to interact with others 
plays the role of a centripetal/agglomeration 
force, whereas competition for land acts as 
a centrifugal/dispersion force. Urban econ-
omists agree with this view because similar 
trade-offs are at the heart of their field and 
the new economic geography. As shown by 
Beckmann (1976), the mere need to inter-
act turns out to be sufficient to generate a 
single-peaked distribution of individuals who 
compete for space.
Ogawa and Fujita (1980) go one step fur-
ther and combine consumers and firms within 
a full-fledged model of general equilibrium. 
The centripetal force—the exchange of infor-
mation among firms—is subject to distance-
decay effects, so the value of a firm’s location 
is based on its proximity to other firms. Since 
workers are keen to minimize commut-
ing costs, the centrifugal force goes through 
the land and labor markets. The clustering 
of many firms in a single area increases the 
average commuting distance for their work-
ers, which in turn increases both the land rent 
workers pay and the wage rate paid by firms. 
As locations are endogenous and interdepen-
dent, the equilibrium distribution of firms 
and households is the balance between these 
opposing forces. Ogawa and Fujita show that 
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the  equilibrium city may display different 
configurations. For example, when commut-
ing costs are high in relation to the distance-
decay effect, the equilibrium involves a full 
integration of business and residential activi-
ties. By contrast, when interactions among 
firms are strong enough to dominate the dis-
persion force generated by commuting costs, 
the equilibrium outcome involves a monocen-
tric city with a central business district (CBD) 
flanked by two residential areas.
Until the 1990s, these and related contri-
butions have attracted little attention in eco-
nomics for two reasons. On the one hand, 
the economics profession has paid little 
attention to the organization of the space-
economy because the constant returns–
perfect competition paradigm can hardly 
cope with the emergence of large economic 
agglomerations and sizable regional dispari-
ties. On the other hand, urban economists 
probably spent too much time streamlining 
the monocentric city model, which has the 
following two advantages: it is compatible 
with the competitive paradigm and it treats 
the CBD as a given. What could bring geog-
raphers and economists together is the clear 
recognition that nonmarket interactions and 
externalities are fundamental to the process 
that gives rise to the city.
3. Power Laws
Power (or scaling) laws have been used 
successfully for studying the relationships 
between body size and shape, so it is easy to 
see why urban geographers are interested in 
such tools when trying to understand how 
the size and morphology of cities are related. 
In chapter 1, Batty considers various power 
functions of city population P(t) at time t: 
(1) Y(t) = αP(t )  α  ,
where Y(t) can stand for very different mag-
nitudes, such as total income, but also for 
the number of new patents or road surfaces, 
while α is the elasticity of Y with respect to P.
The meaning of an elasticity larger or 
smaller than one depends on what Y stands 
for. If this variable represents the total 
income, an exponent larger (smaller) than 
one implies the existence of agglomeration 
economies (diseconomies). If Y stands for 
the stock of a particular type of infrastruc-
ture, an exponent smaller (larger) than one 
indicates that the provision of this infrastruc-
ture displays increasing (decreasing) returns. 
Power functions yield a very good fit when 
tested against a great number of city vari-
ables (see, e.g., Bettencourt et al. 2007).
As argued by Batty, power functions may 
generate the celebrated rank–size distribu-
tion: if we rank cities from the largest to the 
smallest, the population (or other measures) 
of a city at any rank in the hierarchy is the 
size of the largest city divided by its rank. In 
other words, as cities get larger, there are 
fewer of them. Evidently, the law P(r) ∝ 1/r 
is a special case of (1) where α is close to one. 
However, (1) assumes implicitly that the 
population P is the explanatory variable, 
thereby neglecting the well-known endoge-
neity problem, which has two main sources. 
First, population size is likely to capture 
the impact of omitted variables, such as 
the supply of public services and the pres-
ence of natural amenities, which influence 
the population size. Second, city size is itself 
an endogenous variable because people are 
drawn to areas with higher incomes and 
better infrastructures. Estimating (1) shows 
only the extent of correlation between Y and 
P. Therefore, one should refrain from build-
ing too much on such simple relationships. 
There is another reason to be unhappy 
about power functions. Indeed, these func-
tions generate scaling effects that have an 
undesirable consequence: cities that are 
apparently different are scaled versions of 
one another. In other words, using power 
functions amounts to assuming that the city 
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industrial structure doesn’t matter, as if cities 
were more or less the same at various spa-
tial scales. This seems to be implausible. The 
sector in which cities are specialized is criti-
cal in explaining their difference in size and 
activities (Henderson 1988). Large cities are 
often diversified, while the development of 
new information technologies has fostered a 
transformation of their industrial structure, 
which has shifted from sectoral specialization 
to functional specialization. Owing to cities’ 
industrial composition and jobs, large cities 
are not scaled-up versions of small  cities, in a 
manner similar to matryoshka dolls.  
Batty states seven “loose laws” (p. 40) that 
may be given microeconomic underpinnings: 
1)  As cities get bigger, the number of 
potential connections increases as the 
square of the population size. 
2)  As cities get bigger, their aver-
age income increases more than 
proportionally. 
3)  As cities get bigger, there are fewer of 
them. 
4)  As a city grows around its CBD, vari-
ous densities, including the land rent 
and the population density, decline 
 nonlinearly with distance from the 
CBD. 
5)  As cities get bigger, interactions 
between them scale with their size. 
6)  As cities get bigger, their population 
densities flatten. 
7)  As cities get bigger, they become 
greener. 
Each of the first six laws can be shown to 
hold in the monocentric city model of urban 
economics (Fujita 1989) or the economic 
theory of urban systems (Henderson 1988). 
The last law is a more recent finding that 
needs confirmation.
Using power functions, Batty then dis-
cusses, in a very ingenious way, some impli-
cations of his seven laws. For example, the 
potential interaction within a population 
of size P is P(P – 1)/2. Since distance is an 
impediment to interaction, the potential 
interaction is proportional to P(P – 1)/2d2, 
where d is the radius of the city area. We 
thus fall back on the Newtonian gravitational 
model. But, unfortunately, Batty has chosen 
to leave this theory “hanging for future work” 
(p. 43). I am not convinced he made the 
right choice. Furthermore, I didn’t find any 
detailed discussion of how competition for 
land is related to the existence of power laws. 
In a way, this is not surprising because Batty 
does not consider a land market explicitly. It 
would have been interesting and informa-
tive to read a more detailed discussion of the 
socioeconomic foundations of power laws.
4. Spatial Interaction Theory
In chapter 2, Batty surveys one of the 
main theories of human geography, the spa-
tial interaction theory.2 The aim is to study 
the formation of different types of flows, i.e., 
goods, people—customers or workers—and 
information, between a given set of origins O 
and a given set of destinations D. The units of 
flow,  T ij ≥ 0, from origin i ∈ O to destination 
j ∈ D, are designated as trips. In operations 
research,  T ij represents the quantity of a cer-
tain commodity shipped from zone i to zone 
j. In urban geography, O often stands for 
consumers’ residences, while D represents 
firms’ locations (shops, plants, or offices) set 
up in the city. In this case, a trip describes the 
number of customers (commuters) residing 
at i and patronizing shops (working in firms) 
established at j. The key issue is to determine 
how the volumes available in the various ori-
gins are allocated among the destinations.
2 Some of the material presented here is discussed in 
chapter 9 of the book. However, Batty stresses the rela-
tionships between spatial interaction theory and physics, 
whereas I stress those with economics.
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4.1 The Transportation Problem
The basic model, which lies at the root of 
operations research, is the transportation 
problem embedded into the framework of 
economic analysis by Dorfman, Samuelson, 
and Solow (1958). It derives its name from 
the many applications to problems involv-
ing transporting commodities from several 
sources to several destinations. More pre-
cisely, the supply of a certain commodity at 
origin i (the number of consumers) is per-
fectly inelastic and given by  s i ≥ 0, while the 
demand for this good at destination j (the 
number of shops) is also perfectly inelastic 
and given by  d j ≥ 0. Thus, the total amount 
of trips
(2) T =   
i
 
 
  
j
 
 
 T ij =   
i
 
 
 s i =   
j
 
 
 d j 
is constant. With the unit cost of movement 
from i to j denoted by  c ij > 0, the purpose 
of the model is to find the commodity flows 
T ij ≥ 0 that minimize the total transportation 
cost
(3) C =   
i
 
 
  
j
 
 
 c ij  T ij 
subject to the constraints
(4)   
j
 
 
 T ij =  s i    
i
 
 
 T ij =  d j ,
where all numbers are nonnegative integers.
Since both the objective function and the 
constraints are linear, this optimization prob-
lem belongs to the field of linear program-
ming. The optimal graph of flows is sparse: 
a source supplies a small number of desti-
nations, while a destination is supplied by a 
small number of origins. To be precise, the 
matrix [ T ij ] includes many zeroes: there are | O || D | potential flows, but the number of 
positive flows at the equilibrium outcome is 
equal to | O | + | D | − 1.
Then the focus shifted rapidly from opti-
mality to equilibrium (Samuelson 1952). 
When supply and demand functions are elas-
tic, the competitive equilibrium is reached 
when the demand price equals the supply 
price plus the transportation cost for all posi-
tive flows. If the demand price is less than 
the supply price plus the transportation cost, 
then no trade flow occurs. The total number 
of trips T is now endogenous, but the matrix 
[ T ij ] still includes many zeroes. Samuelson’s 
model could have been used to develop a 
trade theory with transportation costs, which 
came into being only with the new trade 
theories.
4.2 Gravity Models
Geographers have followed a different 
path from the economists. To be precise, 
spatial interaction theory builds on the 
Newtonian gravitation law. The canonical 
model assumes that flows between spatially 
separated populations are given by the fol-
lowing gravitational law (p. 62):
(5)  T ij = K P i  P j  d ij −θ .
In this expression, K is a constant,  P i is the 
(possibly unknown) population size at size 
i,  d ij is some measure of distance between i 
and j with  d ij =  d ji , and θ a parameter mea-
suring the intensity of the friction that dis-
tance imposes on interaction. The matrix 
[ T ij ] contains no zeroes because the func-
tional form in (5) implies that there is a 
positive flow, however small it is, for every 
origin–destination pair, provided that  P i and 
P j are both positive. Three families of models 
have been developed.
1)  If the total number of trips T and 
the populations  P i and  P j are given a 
priori, the parameter θ in (5) may be 
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 estimated provided that the constant K 
takes on the following form:
(6) K =  T __ 
  
i
 
 
  
j
 
 
 P i  P j  d ij −θ 
 .
    Observe that the denominator of K 
accounts for multilateral, instead of 
bilateral, resistance terms. It was not 
until Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) 
that trade economists became aware of 
the importance of such effects in grav-
ity equations.
2)  The above model can be relaxed by 
taking only the constraint on the sum of 
the origin-populations  P i (or the desti-
nation-populations  P j ) into account. In 
the former (latter) case, the constant K 
is replaced with K A i (K A j ) in  T ij , where
(7)  A i =   
j
 
 
 P j  d ij −θ   ( A j =   
i
 
 
 P i  d ji −θ ) .
    Notice that  A i ( A j ) captures the idea 
of the accessibility of origin i (destina-
tion j) to (from) the various destinations 
(origins) through the sum of all flows 
emanating (converging) from i (to j). 
The access to opportunities is a basic 
issue in economic theory. However, 
apart from the spatial mismatch model 
in labor economics and very few others, 
economists have paid little attention 
to the spatial accessibility to opportu-
nities, that is, where these opportuni-
ties are available. Here lies a whole 
research domain where economists 
and geographers could fruitfully learn 
from each other, the aim being to bet-
ter understand why opportunities are 
made available in some places, but not 
in others.
    In the origin-constrained model, 
firms’ sizes are endogenous and 
 determined by the spatial behavior of 
consumers. In the destination-con-
strained model, the housing stock used 
in each origin is endogenous. Thus, 
these two models allow one to deter-
mine both the location of firms and 
consumers.
3)  Lastly, when trips are observed, the 
quantities  P i and  P j are endogenous 
and determined from
(8)  P i =   
j
 
 
 T ij   P j =   
i
 
 
 T ij .
    In this way, we start from the flows 
across places to get the distribution of 
activities over the location space, while 
in spatial economics, flows are obtained 
when the economic agents have chosen 
their locations.
But where does (5) come from? And how 
to relate  T ij to the optimizing behavior of 
agents? To the best of my knowledge, few 
geographers have explored the micro foun-
dations of the gravitational forces they use. 
Batty makes a brief reference (p. 69) that 
these models can be generated by using ran-
dom utility theory. This attitude is surprising 
because gravity-like models have recently 
attracted a lot of attention in the trade litera-
ture and beyond, and we now have a better 
understanding of the microeconomic under-
pinnings of such models (Head and Mayer 
2014). In a book on a new science of cities, I 
would have expected Batty to pay more atten-
tion to the relationships between aggregate 
flows and individual spatial behavior. Here 
we encounter what I view as a distinctive 
feature of the approach of many quantitative 
geographers: they focus on semiaggregated 
approaches that provide a good fit of spatial 
magnitudes and are content with intuitive 
explanations of their fundamentals.
811Thisse: The New Science of Cities by Michael Batty
Given the importance of gravity-like equa-
tions in both economics and geography, it is 
important to look at how geographers and 
transportation analysts have studied this fam-
ily of models before economists started their 
investigation. From the historical point of 
view, the first sound approach was pioneered 
by Wilson (1970), who used the concept of 
entropy to explain the formation of flows. The 
argument goes as follows: The analysts often 
have access to some information about certain 
aggregates such as the populations  P i and  P j , 
the total number of trips T, and the total (time 
or energy) cost C spent in commuting or 
shopping. However, they seldom know how 
individual agents make their trip decisions.
4.3 Entropy-Like Models
The entropy within the transportation sys-
tem is defined (up to an additional constant) 
by the following expression:
 E =   
i
 
 
  
j
 
 
 T ij ln ( P i  P j ) −   
i
 
 
  
j
 
 
 T ij ln  T ij .
The maximization of E yields the trips  T ij 
that satisfy the following two conditions: 
(i) they are consistent with given macro-
scopic constraints, such as (8), which are 
known by the analyst, and (ii) they minimize 
the analyst’s bias about the spatial behavior 
of individual agents, which is unknown to the 
analyst. This approach is thus reminiscent 
of that adopted by the econometrician who 
uses discrete choice models in a situation of 
incomplete information.
In most entropy models of trip formation, 
(3) is added as an additional constraint. It is 
then straightforward to show that maximiz-
ing E under the constraints (3) and (8) yields
(9)  T ij =  P i  P j exp( λ i + μ j − β  c ij ),
where  λ i and μ j are the Lagrange multi-
pliers associated with the population con-
straints (8), while β, which is the multiplier 
 associated with the constraint (3), reflects 
individual spatial behavior within the trans-
portation system.
If  c ij = ln  d ij , we fall back to the negative 
power relationship (5). According to the 
value of β, (9) is consistent with a variety of 
individual spatial choice behaviors. In the 
limit, when β is arbitrarily large, the entropy 
maximization boils down to the transporta-
tion problem discussed above. 
Relaxing the number of trips to be made 
to each destination allows consumers located 
at i to choose how to distribute their trips 
within D. In this case, the constrained maxi-
mization of E leads to 
(10)  T ij =  
exp(−β  c ij )
  __  
  k   exp(−β  c kj )
  P i ,
where the ratio is the multinomial logit prob-
ability that a consumer residing in i visits 
zone j. Evidently, when β tends to infinity, 
every consumer located in i patronizes only 
the shops established in the lowest-travel-
cost destination. It should be stressed that 
the most popular justification of the gravity 
equation used in trade presupposes that con-
sumers are endowed with preferences where 
the elasticity of substitution between any two 
goods is constant (CES), so that consumers 
have a taste for variety. This, in turn, implies 
that they divide their purchases among differ-
ent countries. Although seldom noticed, there 
is a close relation between the approaches 
followed by geographers, transportation ana-
lysts, and economists to study (trade) flows.
Geographers have thus developed, before 
the 1990s, tools and concepts that would 
have been very useful to economists. But, in 
the huge number of publications coping with 
the gravity equation in international trade, I 
have never found a reference to spatial inter-
action theory. So, if geographers’ approach to 
power laws disregards the various economet-
ric problems pointed out by economists, it 
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can also be said that economists have ignored 
spatial interaction theory.
4.4 Random Utility Models
Despite the appeal of the entropy mod-
eling strategy, I find it fair to say that the 
easiest way to generalize the transportation 
problem is probably to use the framework of 
random utility maximization developed by 
McFadden (1974). This is done by adding 
a random term  ε j to the unit transportation 
costs  c ij . If the variables  ε j are identically and 
independently Gumbel-distributed with a 
variance proportional to 1/ β  2 , (10) is equal to 
the probability that destination j maximizes 
the utility − c ij +  ε j of a consumer located at 
i. As a consequence, using entropy amounts 
to assuming that each origin accommodates 
a representative consumer endowed with 
an entropy-like subutility nested in quasi-
linear preferences (Anderson, de Palma, and 
Thisse 1992). 
More generally, if the individual utility is 
given by 
  ˜ u ij =  v ij +  ε j ,
where  v ij is the deterministic/measured part 
of the utility, while  ε j accounts for the ana-
lyst’s uncertainty about a consumer’s spatial 
behavior, the probability that a consumer 
visits j is equal to the probability of the vari-
ous occurrences for which j is the consumer’s 
most preferred destination: 
  P j i = E( ˜ u ij =  max 
k
  ˜ u ik ),
where E is the expected value operator. The 
random utility and entropy approaches are 
thus formally equivalent, as shown by Anas 
(1983). They are built on the same idea of 
incomplete information on the analyst’ 
side, but the levels of aggregation differ. 
Economists are likely to prefer the ran-
dom utility approach because of its deeper 
microeconomic underpinnings and because 
it permits using a wider range of economet-
ric techniques. Yet, the entropy approach 
remains a valuable tool for studying specific 
topics, especially the impact of different 
 levels of spatial aggregation.
It is worth stressing that the random util-
ity model may be reinterpreted by assum-
ing that a particular realization of  ε j is the 
matching value between a specific consumer 
residing at i and the shopping or job oppor-
tunities available at j. In this event, consum-
ers residing at i are heterogeneous, in the 
sense that they have different tastes, since 
they make different choices within the same 
set of opportunities. Thus, contrary to gen-
eral belief, geographic models of entropy are 
consistent with rational choice behavior. This 
observation should be sufficient to convince 
economists to pay more attention to what 
geographers have accomplished with spatial 
interaction models. The entropy, multino-
mial logit and CES approaches are very close 
relatives.
That said, whereas prices and many other 
economic variables are absent in spatial 
interaction theory, they can be grafted onto 
random utility models to study markets 
equilibria and related issues (Anderson, de 
Palma, and Thisse 1992). For example, one 
of the main differences between the stan-
dard gravity equation used in trade and its 
microeconomic rationalizations is precisely 
the presence of prices in the generalized 
gravity equations. This highlights differences 
between those variables on which econo-
mists and geographers focus.
5. Graphs and Networks
The third chapter of the book is devoted 
to graph/network theory. Batty observes that 
flows and networks are the opposite sides of 
the same coin (p. 79) and, therefore, deserve 
equal attention. In my opinion, chapter 3 
could have benefited from a fuller discussion 
of the following three topics: 1) The chapter 
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does not really say how graph theory can be 
used to cope with urban problems. However, 
more detailed and stimulating material on 
networks is provided in chapters 6 and 7 of 
this book. 2) More importantly, Batty does 
not develop, or sketch out, any theory that 
might allow us to better understand how 
physical and social networks interact to 
shape cities. Admittedly, the subject is a dif-
ficult one and, to the best of my knowledge, 
the situation is not better in urban econom-
ics where most contributions ignore the 
importance of networks. (Helsley and Zenou 
2014 is a valuable exception.) 3) The loca-
tion of (private or public) facilities on net-
works in not addressed at all, despite a vast 
and well-established literature developed in 
operations research and to which geogra-
phers have contributed (Labbé, Peeters, and 
Thisse 1995). This body of literature both 
highlights how networks affect the location 
of activities and provides efficient algorithms 
to solve numerically large-scale problems. 
Facility location models could be grafted 
onto the operational models proposed by 
Batty in chapter 9 and part III.
In sum, the first three chapters, which 
serve as a foundation for the rest of the book, 
contain a wealth of interesting material with 
which economists (not just urban) should 
be familiar. In particular, I agree with Batty, 
who says that “cities are sets of actions, inter-
actions, and transactions” (p. 115). But this 
only begs the question of who are the relevant 
decisionmakers and how do they interact? 
More specifically, how are their transactions 
conducted? In this respect, these chapters 
offer little that is new to urban economists. 
For example, Batty recognizes that agglom-
eration economies are at work in cities. But 
to understand how cities function, don’t we 
need a better understanding of the forces 
shaping agglomeration economies? Are 
these forces present in small and large cities 
alike? Probably not, but why not? Perhaps 
Batty has chosen to leave these issues to 
 economists who are making substantial prog-
ress in this area. If so, the trade seems fair. 
But then I would have expected these three 
chapters to present a more detailed discus-
sion of network and complexity theories, 
which Batty sees as the main ingredients of 
the new science of cities.
In part II, Batty turns his attention to pro-
cesses that generate cities’ physical forms. 
The focus is mainly on city growth, systems 
of cities, accessibility within cities, and bot-
tom–up hierarchical processes within and 
between cities.
6. City Size Distributions
Chapters 4 and 5 are closely related. The 
former addresses the issues of city size dis-
tribution and urban hierarchy in a nonspa-
tial context, while the latter deals with the 
same issues when cities are embedded in a 
grid-like network. In chapter 4, Batty aims to 
build models that are stripped to the essence 
of the issue in question and, as in chapter 1, 
city population is the main driver. To achieve 
his goal, Batty starts with the simplest model 
in which the population of city i changes 
according to
(11)  P i (t + 1) = [1 +  λ i (t + 1)] P i (t),
where the growth (decay) rates  λ i (t) are 
independent random variables with a finite 
support centered at 0. In other words, cities 
grow randomly, but proportionally to their 
size. In addition, city size cannot be smaller 
than a certain threshold. Since growth shocks 
are independent random variables, it is not 
surprising that the probability of a series of 
positive (negative) shocks in any given place 
is low. Therefore, few cities grow very big 
while few disappear; most places are clus-
tered around the middle. More surprisingly, 
this model generates a distribution that bears 
some strong resemblance to the lognormal 
distribution, which is known to provide a 
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very good approximation of the real-world 
city distribution. This is a remarkable result 
because it would be hard to develop a sim-
pler model for this result to hold. Indeed, 
there is no interaction or competition across 
cities in the random proportionate growth 
model. However, as acknowledged by Batty 
(p. 129), this model includes nothing specific 
to cities, since the aforementioned result 
applies equally to different objects, such as 
the top one hundred U.S. firms from 1955 
to 1994 or the skyscrapers in New York City.
Furthermore, when a population conser-
vation constraint is accounted for, the only 
way for a city population to change is through 
migration. If the size of the migration flow 
between any two cities is given while the two 
cities i and j involved in swapping population 
at time t are chosen randomly, the steady-
state distribution of the process is the nega-
tive exponential that, like power functions, 
gives rise to a log-linear relationship.
Although the big picture seems promising, 
there is too much volatility within the top 
one hundred places, whereas the popula-
tion size of large cities displays a fair amount 
of inertia. In addition, nothing is said about 
where cities are located. So, richer models 
are required.
In chapter 5, Batty explores different 
alternatives that all rely on some form of 
interactions between cities. One of the most 
interesting processes is the Gibrat interac-
tion model, where links are randomly added 
to cities. First, a city i is randomly chosen in 
proportion to its size. The probability of add-
ing a link from i to city j depends positively 
on the size of city i and negatively on the dis-
tance between i and j. Hence, in accordance 
with gravity-like models, larger and closer 
places get preferential treatment.
Starting with an undifferentiated set of 
locations, the Gibrat interaction model gen-
erates a pattern of cities that is in accor-
dance with the hierarchical principle of 
central place theory, i.e., the number of 
cities decreases as we go up the hierarchy. 
Unfortunately, despite its stronger intuitive 
appeal, this model still lacks any substan-
tial socioeconomic foundations. The differ-
ence is striking when it is compared to with 
what Fujita, Krugman, and Mori (1999) have 
accomplished. These authors show that a 
regular hierarchical central place system 
emerges as the equilibrium outcome of a set-
ting where manufacturing firms and farmers 
compete for workers who choose their resi-
dential locations and types of job while ship-
ping goods is costly. Manufacturing clusters 
form cities with different sizes and industrial 
structures. Because manufactured goods 
are differentiated, trade between cities of 
the same rank may be larger than trade with 
smaller cities. As a result, different types 
of hierarchies interlock within the urban 
system.
Batty and Fujita et al. thus concur in view-
ing the urban hierarchy as the unintentional 
consequence of a decentralized process. 
Furthermore, both approaches are able to 
replicate real-world regularities from the 
bottom up. However, Batty’s models remain, 
at least to me, black boxes. By contrast, in 
Fujita, Krugman, and Mori (1999), the urban 
system arises as the aggregate outcome of 
interactions among firms and households 
competing on the product, land, and labor 
markets.
7. Urban Morphology
In chapter 6, but also throughout his book, 
Batty stresses the importance of the physical 
form (or spatial organization) of cities, from 
which “we infer processes that create the 
structures we see in cities” (p. 179). But there 
is a lack of any compelling evidence sup-
porting such a strong statement. Obviously, 
I agree that the design of a city may foster 
or dampen particular social relations, but 
it does not determine many socioeconomic 
relations. In addition, various facets of the 
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spatial organization of a city, such as the 
number of subcenters, are endogenous and 
determined by the interplay between differ-
ent socioeconomic forces.
For sure, studying the physical form of 
a city, its built spaces, and their evolution 
are important issues for urban planners and 
architects, and probably for real estate econ-
omists too. By contrast, the physical form of 
cities is not a top priority in urban economic 
theory, where many papers happily focus on 
linear cities. Only a handful of contributions 
to the literature pay attention to the fact that 
cities are two- or three-dimensional. There 
are at least two reasons for this neglect. First, 
many fundamental economic issues (e.g., the 
shape of the land rent profile and population 
density, the role of spatial externalities in 
explaining the emergence of a CBD, or the 
mono- or polycentric nature of the metro-
politan area) may be studied by using linear 
models. Second, working with two (or three) 
dimensions requires the choice of a particu-
lar metric expressing the distance between 
any two locations. One implication, which is 
often ignored by urban economists, is that 
different metrics need not yield the same 
equilibrium outcome. To Batty, this should 
not come as a surprise: when urban trans-
portation networks have different shapes, 
economic activities are not distributed in 
the same way within cities. This issue is not 
a trivial one. As transportation and land use 
are intimately related, transportation poli-
cies are one of the main instruments used by 
governments to control and promote urban 
growth. So, Batty is right when he reminds 
us to pay more attention to the configuration 
of spatial networks. To the best of my knowl-
edge, very little is known about the possible 
impact of transportation network configura-
tions on the economic performance of cities. 
This can be accomplished only in a genuinely 
two-dimensional network.
Chapters 6 and 7 are linked. Many con-
cepts used in these chapters come from the 
literature on urban planning and design, 
as well as graph and network theories. In 
particular, Batty shows how difficult it is to 
measure a site’s accessibility and the distance 
between two sites in a city, where different 
types of networks are mixed and superim-
posed. Although the focus is different, the 
content of these two chapters is more in tune 
with network economics. The discussion 
provided by Batty also suggests that studying 
coupled networks is a hard task; this proba-
bly explains why the subject is not addressed 
in any depth in chapter 3.
8. Cellular Automata Models
Large cities are not clusters organized 
around a CBD, but are formed by a hierarchy 
of clusters whose distribution seems to obey 
certain rules. Analysis of how the structure of 
a city evolves in response to some shock has 
been pioneered by Fujita and Ogawa (1982). 
These authors showed that the interplay 
between commuting costs and spatial exter-
nalities among firms may generate a vari-
ety of land developments and urban forms 
nesting different types of centers. Thus far, 
despite quite a few valuable empirical stud-
ies and a handful of theoretical papers, urban 
economic theory doesn’t have much to say 
about the transition from a monocentric to 
a polycentric urban structure and the organi-
zation of subcenters within the metropolitan 
area. Batty seems to have more to offer in 
chapters 8 and 9, but his models, like this of 
Fujita and Ogawa, are also solved numeri-
cally. Still, his approach is different in many 
respects from that followed by those authors. 
It epitomizes how geographers tackle this 
difficult problem.
Chapter 8 shows the author at his best. 
The story goes like this. Assume a trader 
located at the crossing of two rivers. For 
quite a while, this trader remains alone. 
However, other traders also seek a place to 
settle down. In doing so, they move  randomly 
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north or south or west or east across the loca-
tional plane. Given enough time and enough 
traders, a second trader will locate in the 
vicinity of the first one because of the advan-
tages generated by the division of labor. As 
time goes by, owing to the benefits gener-
ated by a large size, more and more traders 
become attracted by this area. Since traders 
consume land, new traders are more likely 
to find the available locations at the fringe 
of the settlement. Does the cluster look like 
von Thünen’s circles? Unexpectedly, the 
answer is no. Traders distribute themselves 
across space according to a tree-like pattern. 
In other words, this model—which relies on 
the tension between agglomeration effects 
and competition for land—generates a net-
work structure. It then becomes clear why 
networks and graphs are so central to Batty’s 
analysis of cities. Moreover, the resultant 
structure is fractal, that is, it is the same at 
different spatial scales. All of this differs 
from the few attempts made in urban eco-
nomics to move away from the canonical 
monocentric city model.  
Batty goes on to impose more control over 
the process of land development by appeal-
ing to the concept of cellular automata (CA), 
one the main tools used in contemporary 
human geography. Recall that an automata is 
a virtual machine, consisting of a finite num-
ber of states driven by inputs that change 
the states of the machine into outputs, e.g., 
from undeveloped to developed. At the next 
period, these outputs are used as inputs to 
generate new changes. In a CA, changes are 
initiated only from neighboring cells located 
on a rectangular grid. To illustrate, consider 
the Moore neighborhood  N i of cell i, which 
is formed by the eight cells in the N–S and 
W–E axes, plus NW–SE and NE–SW diago-
nals. The working of a CA may be described 
by the following principle (Batty 2005): If 
something happens in the Moore neighbor-
hood of a cell, then something may happen 
to the cell in question.
In its simplest form, the state  A it of cell i 
(a land plot) at time t is given by  A it = 1 (0) if 
i is developed (undeveloped). For the “then” 
to apply, we have to specify a transition rule 
describing how cell i changes from t to t + 1. 
One such rule is given by 
(12)  F it =   
k∈ N i 
 
  A kt 
and
(13) if  F it > Ψ (which is given),
 then  A it+1 = 1.
In other words, if cell i has more than Ψ 
developed cells in its Moore neighborhood, 
then it is developed at time t + 1 if it is unde-
veloped at time t and remains (un)developed 
otherwise. This is in accordance with the 
idea underlined in new economic geogra-
phy—large places are more attractive than 
small places. In particular, when Ψ = 1 all 
cells belonging to the Moore neighborhood 
of a developed cell at time t are developed 
at time t + 1, and so on. Evidently, more 
sophisticated transition rules can be used.
One of the most natural extensions is to 
consider probabilistic transition rules. For 
example, (12) and (13) are replaced by
  p it =   
k∈ N i 
 
  A kt / 8
and 
 if  
_ Ψ <  p it , then  A it+1 = 1,
where  p it is the probability of develop-
ment and  
_ Ψ is a positive random variable 
whose  realization must be smaller than the
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 percentage of developed sites in the neigh-
borhood of i.
In another extension, which is in the spirit 
of the gravity models discussed above, it is 
assumed that
   F it =   
k∈ N i 
 
  A kt / d ik 2 ,
which allows us to capture more elaborated 
neighboring effects than (13). In a third 
extension, one distinguishes between differ-
ent types of activities and makes the devel-
opment of a cell dependent on the activities 
located in its vicinity.
To an extent, the transition rule specifies 
the potential of a particular piece of land to 
be developed in a certain environment. By 
applying the chosen rule recursively, one 
generates a pattern of land use over time, 
that is, the way a city grows. By tweaking 
rules over time, it is even possible to adjust 
to unexpected evolutions. Unfortunately, 
sophisticated rules seem to yield land devel-
opment patterns that are hard to trace. In 
addition, the number of possibilities is gigan-
tic, so that choosing the right transition rules 
is very difficult. This leads Batty to write that 
the problem is “to select those rules that are 
observable in the way real cities develop, 
while keeping such models as simple as pos-
sible” (p. 269).
As shown by the work of urban geogra-
phers, especially Batty’s, CA-based models 
have proven to be useful “to replicate many 
different generative phenomena that charac-
terize many different forms of cities” (p. 267). 
However, by using transition rules that are 
often ad hoc or simple rules of thumb, these 
models fail to explain why and how cities 
actually grow and develop. CA-based models 
cannot have a real predictive power as long 
as they do not recognize that cities are the 
result of choices made by agents with their 
own motivations. Most important, how can 
these models help to design public policies 
if they ignore know how agents react to the 
new incentive systems generated by these 
policies.
I am unable to see how CA-based mod-
els allow for a more disaggregated approach 
than the spatial interaction models discussed 
above. To what extent does a CA really differ, 
say, from the Gibrat interaction model? In 
addition, I don’t understand why Batty has 
chosen, in his new science of cities, to ignore 
agent-based models, which allow for more 
sophisticated behaviors than CA-based 
models (Batty 2005). In this alternative 
framework, agents—not to be confused 
with the agents of microeconomic theory—
are entities that act by themselves according 
to some protocol. For example, Caruso et 
al. (2007) studied local interactions among 
residents who also value green externalities, 
stemming from the proximity to farmers. 
These authors combine an urban economics 
model with a CA to simulate neighborhood 
interactions over time in a two-dimensional 
space. Their model generates a path-
dependent equilibrium that, according to 
the parameter values, can display a wide 
range of urban morphologies, which need 
not be star-shaped as in the monocentric 
city model. By studying both the equilib-
rium outcomes and their evolution, Caruso 
et al. (2007) offer a promising potential for 
interaction between economists and geogra-
phers. Note also the existence of a connec-
tion between the agent-based models used 
by geographers and evolutionary game the-
ory, which seems worth exploring.
In chapter 9, Batty argues that “fast, 
simple, visual, and accessible models” are 
needed (p. 276). And indeed, if these mod-
els are to be used to help decisionmakers 
and stakeholders, we had better tools these 
people understand. That is a sensible objec-
tive but not necessarily what I see as the 
main objective of the new science of cities. 
Moreover, I found it hard to figure out what 
kind of  objective the decisionmakers have in 
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such models, apart from seeking a compro-
mise. And, for a compromise to arise, it must 
be that distinct parties have diverging but 
specific goals.
In this chapter, Batty also discusses how to 
use spatial interaction models in applications 
to modal choice. His settings differ greatly 
from, say, Regional Economy, Land Use 
and Transportation (RELU-TRAN), that is, 
a computable general equilibrium model of 
a metropolitan economy developed by Anas 
and coauthors (Anas and Liu 2007) that stud-
ies modal choices but accounts for product, 
land, and labor markets. Anas and Hiramatsu 
(2012) have used the model RELU-TRAN 
to simulate the impact of a gas price increase 
on trips and transport modes in the short 
run, and location patterns in the long run.
In the foregoing, I’ve stressed the simi-
larities between the approaches followed by 
geographers and economists, and thus the 
resulting potential for interaction. On the 
other hand, the operational models above 
epitomize the differences between urban 
geography and urban economics: the role of 
markets is meager in urban geography and 
the concept of equilibrium is not in the pic-
ture. Note, however, that Batty concludes 
chapter 9 with an overview of some ongoing 
extensions of his models. Interestingly, they 
seem more in line with what Anas does.
In part III, the focus shifts “rather dra-
matically from understanding cities to their 
design” (p. 301). A priori, this bears some 
resemblance to what is known in urban eco-
nomics as the optimal city. However, the aim 
here is different: Batty wants to take into 
account the ways local governments inter-
vene in cities. To achieve his goal, he uses 
to the same tools as in parts I and II, which 
makes the whole book very coherent from 
the methodological viewpoint. But it might 
have been more interesting for the reader 
if what we have learned from urban public 
finance (Glaeser 2012) had been incorpo-
rated. The material presented in part III 
might be more useful to urban planners 
than, in my opinion, to urban economists. 
This is why I have chosen not to discuss this 
part but to concentrate in detail on parts I 
and II, which address issues related to what 
we, as economists, do.
9. Concluding Remarks
By focusing on urban form, networks, and 
flows, Batty has made a substantial contribu-
tion to the science of city design and planning. 
His book also contains many concepts, ideas, 
and results that should be of interest to urban 
and trade economists. Although urban econo-
mists, very much like urban geographers such 
as Batty himself, aim to develop a bottom–up 
approach to cities, the two approaches differ. 
The main source of disagreement appears to 
lie in the methodological foundations of these 
two sciences of cities. As a microeconomist, I 
believe that macroscopic phenomena can best 
be understood by examining how they arise 
from the motivated actions and interactions 
of individual agents in a world where various 
types of uncertainty prevail. Batty’s approach 
treats cities as entities formed by purposeless 
agents whose aggregate behavior is governed 
by stochastic laws. By contrast, the approach 
of urban economics and the new economic 
geography treats cities as emerging from the 
decisions of many rational agents—firms, 
households, developers, and local govern-
ments—whose actions are often coordinated 
by markets. However, as seen above, I do 
not see this difference as an insurmountable 
obstacle to interactions between urban geog-
raphers and urban economists.
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